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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1) Whether the District Court's Conclusion of Law that:
"Plaintiff's claim that the employment agreement
was entered into in lieu of alimony fails because,
absent written agreement to the contrary, alimony
terminates upon remarriage"
is contrary to law.

This is solely a question of law reviewable

under the "correction-of-error" standard.

See Western Kane

County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d
1376 (Utah 1987).
(2) Whether the District Court's "Conclusion of Law" that:

"Plaintiff fail (sic) to establish that the meaning or
intent of the employment agreement was anything other than
its clearly written terms which would give rise to an
enforceable agreement under any one of the legal theories
advanced during the course of this litigation"
is supported by the record.

This is a question of fact

reviewable under the "substantial evidence" standard.

See George

v. Peterson, 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983).
(3) Whether the District Court's "Conclusion of Law" that:
"The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous on
its face and not subject to change by parole (sic) evidence"
is supported by the record and in accordance with the law.
is both a question of fact and one of law.

The factual aspect is

reviewable under the "substantial evidence" standard.
v. Peterson. 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983).

This

See George

The legal aspect is

reviewable under the "correction of error" standard.

See Western

Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1976).
(4) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow Brent Turley to testify regarding John Hall's
offer to make the down-payment on the residence which Mr. Hall
purchased from Mr. Turley in the form of an employment agreement
with Mr. Hall's company.

This issue is reviewable under the

"abuse of discretion" standard.

See Intermountain Physical

Medicine Associates v. Micro-Dex Corporation. 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah
1987).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Plaintiff sets forth verbatim the following
determinative statute.
Section 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Ann.
Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the
remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony
is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third
District Court ruling that "Plaintiff have judgment against the
Defendant of no cause of action."
II. Statement of Facts
(1) At all relevant times prior to June 8, 1981, Plaintiff
(then Margaret B. Hall and for the sake of simplicity hereinafter
referred to as "Mrs. Hall") and Defendant's President and sole
shareholder, John A. Hall, were husband and wife.

(R. 00148 and

Addendum 1 attached hereto)
(2) On or about February 20, 1981, John A. Hall filed an
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
civil no. D-81-695 (the "Divorce Action"), seeking to terminate
the marital relationship then existing between himself and Mrs.
Hall.

(See Trial Exhibit 6-P)
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(3) On or about June 8, 1981, a Decree Of Divorce was
entered in the Divorce Action dissolving the marital relationship
between Mr. and Mrs. Hall.

(R. 00148 and Addendum 1 attached

hereto)
(4)

The Decree Of Divorce provided that Mrs. Hall would

receive no alimony.

(Trial Exhibit 6-P)

(5) On or about February 20, 1981 (approximately the same
date as that upon which Mr. Hall filed the Divorce Action)
Mrs.Hall entered into an agreement with Defendant which was
nominally entitled "Employment Agreement".

(R. 00148 and

Addendum 1 attached hereto)
(6) Under the terms of the so-called Employment Agreement,
Defendant agreed to pay Mrs. Hall $1,000.00 per month commencing
March 1, 1981, and continuing through February 1984.

Defendant

also agreed that Mrs. Hall would be entitled to participate in
Defendant's Profit Sharing Plan.

(Trial Exhibit 1-P)

(7) Neither Mrs. Hall nor Defendant ever intended that Mrs.
Hall would go to work for Defendant under the so-called
Employment Agreement.

(Trial Tr. p. 18, line 13 through p. 19,

line 14; p. 29, lines 21-25; p. 30, lines 19-24; p. 43, lines 1013; p. 44, lines 9-12)
(8) The consideration which Defendant requested and which
Mrs. Hall agreed to provide in exchange for Defendant's promises
under the so-called Employment Agreement was Mrs. Hall's promise
to forego any claim which she might have had to receive alimony
in connection with the Divorce Action simultaneously taking place
between Mrs. Hall and John A. Hall.
p. 44, lines 9-12)
4

(Trial Tr. p.19, lines 5-14;

(9) Mrs. Hall in fact never went to work for Defendant
under the so-called Employment Agreement.

(R. 00149 and Addendum

1 attached hereto)
(10)

In spite of the fact that Mrs. Hall never went to work

for Defendant, Defendant paid Mrs. Hall the sum of $15,000.00
over a period of approximately fourteen and one-half months in
accordance with the terms of the so-called Employment Agreement.
(R. 00149 and Addendum 1 attached hereto)
(11)

In or around May of 1982, Defendant discontinued

payments to Mrs. Hall under the so-called Employment Agreement.
(R. 00149 and Addendum 1 attached hereto)
(12) Mrs. Hall remarried on or about May 31, 1982, shortly
after Defendant's termination of payments to her under the socalled Employment Agreement.

(R.00149 and Addendum 1 attached

hereto)
(13) Mrs. Hall filed her original Complaint commencing this
action on or about May 25, 1992.

(R. 00002)

(14) Thereafter, Mrs. Hall moved to the State of Arizona
with her new husband and (with the exception of the filing of
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss on March 23, 1982; which was
submitted for decision on November 23, 1990; and which was denied
by the District Court on November 30, 1990) this action remained
inactive until on or about June 26, 1990, when Mrs. Hall's new
counsel filed a Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint.
00016)
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(R.

(15) The District Court granted Mrs. Hall's motion to amend
on September 13, 1990.

(R. 00022)

(16) The District Court entered a PRE-TRIAL ORDER jointly
prepared by the parties on November 16, 1992.

(R. 00148 and

Addendum 1 attached hereto)
(17) A bench trial of this action was held before the
Honorable John A. Roklch on November 14, 1991.

(R. 00153)

(18) At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Rokich took the
matter under advisement.

(R. 00153) On March 4, 1992, Judge

Rokich entered Judgment that Mrs. Hall "have judcfment against
Defendant of no cause of action."

(R. 00169 and Addendum 2

attached hereto)
(19) Mrs. Hall timely filed her Notice Of Appeal on April
2, 1992.

(R.00175)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

(1) The Defendant corporation's obligations under the
Employment Agreement did not terminate upon Mrs. Hall's
remarriage.
The district court ruled that Defendant's obligations under
the Employment Agreement terminated automatically upon Mrs.
Hall's remarriage by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated § 30-3-5(5).

It is Mrs. Hall's position that Section

30-3-5(5), U.C.A., did not terminate the Defendant corporation's
obligations under the Employment Agreement upon her remarriage
for three reasons.

First, the Employment Agreement is not an

"order of the court".

Section 30-3-5(5) expressly applies only

to "any order of the court". More importantly, the Employment

6

agreement was not entered into by parties to divorce proceedings;
it was entered into by Mrs. Hall and the Defendant corporation.
Finally, the Defendant corporation was obviously not paying Mrs.
Hall alimony; corporations do not pay alimony.

The Defendant

corporation was paying Mrs. Hall to forego any right which she
might otherwise have had to seek alimony in the Divorce Action
simultaneously taking place between Mrs. Hall and Defendant's
President and sole shareholder.
(2) The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law with respect to the "parol evidence rule" are neither
supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with the law.
The parol evidence rule only applies to exclude evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations of
the parties for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of
a written agreement where the written agreement was intended bv
the parties to represent their full and complete agreement.

In

the case at bar it is clear that neither party intended for the
Employment Agreement to represent their full and complete
agreement.

Both parties, as well as the attorney that drafted

the Employment Agreement on Defendant's behalf, testified that
there were contemporaneous oral agreements between the parties
relating to its subject matter which were not included in the
Employment Agreement.
Furthermore, the circumstances of this case clearly reveal
that Defendant's contention that Mrs. Hall was intended to go to
work under the so-called Employment Agreement is preposterous and
not supported by substantial evidence.
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Moreover, Judge Rokich made it very clear both at the time
Defendant moved to dismiss after Mrs. Hall rested her case and
again during closing argument that he considered absurd
Defendant's contention that the parties intended that Mrs. Hall
would be required to go for Defendant under the Employment
Agreement.
Even if the parol evidence were otherwise applicable,
however, the rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence
to show that there was a different consideration supporting
Defendant's obligations under the Employment Agreement than that
stated in the agreement itself.
Finally, while the terms the Employment Agreement may not be
ambiguous, the character of the agreement itself is ambiguous
rendering the parol evidence rule inapplicable.
(3) The district court abused its discretion in disallowing
the testimony of Brent Turley.
Mrs. Hall attempted to introduce (and preferred) the
testimony of Mr. Brent Turley that, when Mr. Hall purchased Mr.
Turley's home, Mr. Hall offered to pay the down payment on the
home in the form of an employment agreement with his company
pursuant to which Mr. Turley would receive a monthly "salary" and
benefits, but would not be required to go work for Mr. Hall's
company.

The district court sustained Defendant's objection to

Mr. Turley's testimony on the grounds of relevance.
Mrs. Hall submits that, contrary to the District Court's
ruling, Mr. Turley's testimony would clearly have been relevant.
Mr. Hall's offer to pay the down payment on the purchase of Mr.
8

Turley's home shows that on at least one other occasion Mr. Hall
had used an employment agreement with his company as
consideration for a personal obligation under circumstances in
which it was clear that the "employee" would not be required to
actually go to work for Mr. Hall's company.

Accordingly, it is

Mrs. Hall's position that the district court abused its
discretion in disallowing Mr. Turley's testimony.
ARGUMENTS
(1) The Defendant corporation's obligations under the
Employment Agreement did not terminate upon Mrs. Hall's
remarriage.
The Pre-Trial Order governing the trial of this matter
identified the first "Question Of Law Remaining For
Determination" as:
Whether Defendant's obligations under the
Employment Agreement terminated automatically upon
Plaintiff's remarriage by virtue of Utah Code
Annotated Section 30-3-5(5).
(R. 00148 and Addendum 1 attached hereto)
In its Conclusions Of Law, the District Court answered this
first question in the affirmative.
attached hereto)

(R. 00172 and Addendum 3

It is Mrs. Hall's contention that the District

Court's ruling on this question is contrary to law.
Section 30-3-5(5), UCA, provides in pertinent part that
"Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former
spouse." (Emphasis added).
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There are at least three reasons why § 30-3-5(5) did not
operate to terminate Defendant's obligations under the Employment
Agreement.

First, the Employment Agreement is not an "order of

the court".

Section 30-3-5(5) expressly applies only to "any

order of the court."

More importantly, however, the Employment

Agreement was not entered into between parties involved in
divorce proceedings; it was not entered into between Mrs. Hall
and Mr. Hall.

It was entered into between Mrs. Hall and the

Defendant Process Instruments and Control, Inc., a Utah
corporation.

Finally, the Defendant corporation was obviously

not paying Mrs. Hall "alimony"; it was paying her to forego any
right to alimony which she might otherwise have had in connection
with the Divorce Action simultaneously taking place between Mrs.
Hall and Defendant's President and sole shareholder.
Accordingly the District Court's Conclusion Of Law that:
"The Plaintiff's claim that the employment agreement
was entered into in lieu of alimony fails because, absent
written agreement to the contrary, alimony terminates upon
remarriage"
is contrary to law and should be set aside.
(2) The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law with respect to the "parol evidence rule" are neither
supported by the evidence nor in accordance with the law.
The Employment Agreement provides that Mrs. Hall "agrees to
faithfully perform the duties assigned to her to the best of her
ability and to devote such time and skills as shall be necessary
therefor."

(Trial Exhibit 1-P). It is Mrs. Hall's position

that, notwithstanding this language, the parties never intended
that she would ever go to work for Defendant.
10

Rather, the

consideration being given by Mrs. Hall was her agreement to
forego any right to alimony which she may have had in connection
with the Divorce Action.
Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Order identifies the first
"Factual Dispute Remaining For Trial" as:
Whether the consideration given by Plaintiff for
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was
her agreement to forego any claim to alimony in
connection with the divorce proceeding simultaneously
taking place between Plaintiff and Defendant's
President and sole shareholder, John A. Hall.
(R. 00150 and Addendum 1 attached hereto)
At trial, Mrs. Hall testified that, notwithstanding the
language of the Employment Agreement, neither she nor Defendant
ever intended that she would actually go to work for Defendant.
(Trial Tr. at p. 18, lines 13 through p. 19, line 14; p. 29,
lines 21-25; p. 30, lines 19-24; p. 43, lines 10-13; p. 44, lines
9-11).
Mrs. Hall also prof erred * the testimony of Mr. Brent
Turley that "Mr. Hall offered to purchase ... Mr. Turley's home,
using as the down payment an employment contract just like the
one we [have] here [under] which Mr. Turley would be an employee
of [Mr. Hall's] company, receive salary and benefits in exchange
for the down payment on his home."

(Trial Tr. at p. 60, lines

16-22) Mr. Turley's testimony was being offered to show that Mr.
Hall had on at least one other occasion used an employment
1

The District Court sustained Defendant's objection to
Mr. Turley's testimony on the grounds of relevance. Trial Tr. at
p. 60, lines 14-15. That this ruling was erroneous will be
demonstrated in part (3) below.
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contract with his company as consideration in connection with his
own personal obligations under circumstances where it was clear
that neither party intended that the "employee" would actually go
to work for Mr. Hall's company.
Defendant, however, objected to the introduction of any
evidence to support Mrs. Hall's contention that, despite the
language of the Employment Agreement, the parties never intended
that she would ever go to work for Defendant on the basis that
such evidence was barred by the "parol evidence rule".
Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Order identifies the second
"Question Of Law Remaining For Determination" as:
Whether the "Parol Evidence Rule" precludes
Plaintiff from introducing evidence of contemporaneous
conversations, statements, or representations of the
parties for the purpose of varying or adding to the
terms of the Employment Agreement.
(R. 00150 and Addendum 1 attached hereto)
In its Conclusions of Law, the District Court ruled with
respect to the parol evidence issue as follows:
6.

Plaintiff fail (sic) to establish that the meaning

or intent of the employment agreement was anything other than its
clearly written terms ...
7.

The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous

on its face and not subject to change by parole (sic) evidence.
(R. 00172-73 and Addendum 3 attached hereto)
As will be demonstrated below, Conclusion of Law number 6 is
in reality a finding of fact which is not supported by
substantial evidence and Conclusion of Law number 7 is contrary
to law.
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The operation and effect of the parol evidence rule was
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Larsen Bros. Const.. 731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986):
[The parol evidence rule] operates ... to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or
representations offered for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of an integrated contract.
(Emphasis original)•
Of greater importance to the case at bar, the Court further
explained that "the parol evidence rule applies only if it was
intended by the parties to represent the full and complete
agreement of the parties ..."

731 P.2d at 486 (emphasis added).

In determining whether a particular contract was intended by the
parties to be an integrated agreement, the trial court must weigh
all relevant evidence, both parol and written.

See, e.g.

Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 487; and Webb v. R.O.A. General.
Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991).
In the case at bar, it is absolutely clear that neither
party intended for the Employment Agreement to represent their
"full and complete agreement".
Mrs. Hall will first marshall the evidence in support of
Defendant's contention that the Employment Agreement was intended
to be the "full and complete agreement" between the parties:
1.

First, there is the Employment Agreement itself, which

appears to be clear and unambiguous on its face.

(Trial Exhibit

1-P)
2.

Second, Mr. Hall testified that the Employment Agreement

was nothing more than an agreement pursuant to which Mrs. Hall
would be paid $1,000.00 per month and receive benefits to come to
work for the Defendant.

(Trial Tr. at p. 84, lines 12-16)
13

3.

Finally, the attorney that drafted the Employment

Agreement on behalf of the Defendant, Mr. Peter Ennenga,
testified that he did not know one way or the other whether the
Employment Agreement represented the full and complete agreement
between the parties.

(Trial Tr. at p. 137, line 14 through p.

38, line 21)
Mrs. Hall submits that under the circumstances of this case,
the evidence marshalled in support of Defendant's contention that
the Employment Agreement was intended by the parties to represent
their "full and complete" agreement is not substantial.

Besides

Mrs. Hall's testimony that neither party ever intended that she
would actually go to work for Defendant, the following evidence
further demonstrates beyond question that the Employment
Agreement was never intended to represent the parties' full and
complete agreement:
1.

Even though Mrs. Hall never went to work for Defendant

for even one minute, Defendant sent Mrs. Hall $15,000.00 at the
rate of $1,000.00 per month over a period of approximately
fourteen and one-half months.
hereto)

(R. 00149 and Addendum 1 attached

Ironically, Defendant attempted to explain this

extraordinary circumstance as the result of an alleged oral
agreement reached bestween the parties at the time of the
execution of the Employment Agreement.

Mr. Hall testified that,

in light of the fact that Mrs. Hall was ill and needed money to
live on, Defendant orally agreed to pay her $1,000.00 per month
salary even though she would not be expected to come to work
until she had recovered from her illness (Mr. Hall testified that
he anticipated that might be about six months).
14

Preposterously,

Mr. Hall further testified that the alleged oral agreement was
that Mrs. Hall would be required to repay Defendant for the
salary received by her prior to the time when she actually went
to work for Defendant by working for an identical period of time
without any compensation after the expiration of the three year
term of the agreement.

(Trial Tr. at p. 64, lines 8-22).

In his

published deposition testimony, Mr. Hall explained how this
curious orally agreed to arrangement would work:
Question: ... Would this agreement, this oral
agreement that is not part of this employment contract
... suppose the six-month period in which Mrs. Hall was
sick actually came to pass and []at the end of six
months she came to work [] after that, and the contract
terminates ... February 28, 1984, would she reimburse
the company by performing services for an additional
six months after that period for free?
Answer:
Essentially, that is correct.
for free, she was paid in advance.

It is not

(Trial Tr. at p. 68, line 21 through p. 60, line 7; see also the
June 25, 1991, deposition of John Hall at p. 24, line 19 through
p. 25, line 4).
2.

Likewise comical is Mr. Hall's testimony regarding the

circumstances surrounding Defendant's decision to terminate Mrs.
Hall's "employment".

Mr. Hall testified that the termination,

which occurred on or about May 14, 1982, was a result of the fact
that Defendant learned that Mrs. Hall had gone to work for a
company by the name of Struve Distributing.

However, Mr. Hall

testified that Defendant learned of Mrs. Hall's employment at
Struve Distributing in the Fall of 1981, six to nine months prior
to the decision to terminate Mrs. Hall's "employment".

Mr. Hall

further testified, incredibly, that when he discovered that Mrs.
Hall had gone to work for Struve he telephoned her at Struve and
15

advised her that: "If you are going to work with Struve you are
in a position where you should work at our company."

According

to Mr. Hall, Mrs. Hall's response was "Go to Hell."

(Trial Tr.

at p. 100, line 14 through p. 106, line 2; see also Deposition of
John A. Hall at p. 33, lines 4-24).

Yet, according to Mr. Hall,

in spite of the fact that sometime in the fall of 1981 Mrs. Hall
had informed him in no uncertain terms that she was not going to
go to work for Defendant, Defendant continued to pay Mrs. Hall
her $1,000.00 per month "salary" for between six and nine months
before terminating her "employment" for "failure to report to
work."
3.

(Deposition of John A. Hall at p. 32, line 16).
After Defendant supposedly discovered that Mrs. Hall was

employed at Struve Distributing, Defendant sent Mrs. Hall her
regular semi-monthly $500.00 "paycheck" date April 30, 1992, with
the notation "final check" (See Exhibit 3-P, check no. 1188).
When Mrs. Hall refused to cash the April 30, 1992 check,
Defendant sent her a second check, again with th€* notation "final
check" (see Exhibit 3-P, check no. 1201), however, this second
"final check" was accompanied by a Utah Department of Employment
Security - Separation Notice explaining that Mrs, Hall was being
"fired" because she was "working for Struve Dist. in SLC".
Exhibit 4-P)

(See

Query, why would Defendant send Mrs. Hall a final

check if it was truly "firing" her for "failing to report to
work" (Deposition of John A. Hall at p. 32, line 16) and for
working for Struve Distributing.

The short answer is that

Defendant's explanation is a transparent fabrication.
4.

When Defendant moved for dismissal after Mrs. Hall

rested her case, Judge Rokich made very clear that he did not
16

believe Defendant's contention that Mrs, Hall was expected to go
to work for Defendant under the Employment Agreement:
The Court:
... 14 months went by and he makes
the payments and then arbitrarily cuts it off because
she doesn't show up for work. He never expected her to
come to work in the first place. I believe this is
nothing more than an alimony agreement .... Despite all
the writings, why would you have somebody receive
checks for 14 months? ...
Mr. Mclntyre: Your Honor, one other thing that I
have a real problem with -- and then still getting back
to the old parol evidence rule problem.
The Court:
That doesn't bother me. He knew
what they were attempting to do. All of us know they
were attempting to do something for some reason
unbeknownst to this court, and so I'm not so naive to
be sitting here saying they drew up this employment
agreement, that they actually intended for her to go to
work, Thev didn't get along before, so how would they
get along in the same office? Let's be practical and
realistic.
(Trial Tr. at p. 72, lines 14-17; p. 73, lines 3-4; p. 74, lines
9-20).
5.

During closing argument, Judge Rokich foreclosed

Plaintiff's counsel from even arguing on the issue of whether the
parties ever intended that Mrs. Hall would go to work for
Defendant, indicating that his concern was the effect of Section
30-3-5(5), UCA, on Defendant's obligations under the Employment
Agreement.
6.

(Trial Tr. at p. 149, lines 9-25)

Mr. Hall's and Defendant's attorney, Mr. Ennenga,

testified that the Employment Agreement did not represent the
full and complete agreement between the parties.

As did Mr.

Hall, Mr. Ennenga testified that, at the time of the parties'
execution of the Employment Agreement, they entered into an oral
agreement that, in light of her poor health at that time, Mrs.
Hall would not be required to report to work until she had
17

recovered from her illness.
7.

(Trial Tr. at p. 119, lines 13-23)

As indicated above, Plaintiff preferred that Brent

Turley would have testified that Mr. Hall attempted to pay the
down-payment on the home which he purchased from Mr. Turley in
the form of an employment contract with his company under which
Mr. Turley would have received salary and benefits for a period
of time in lieu of a cash down-payment.

(Trial Tr. at p. 60,

lines 16-22)
In short, there is no substantial evidence supporting the
District Court's conclusions of law/findings of fact on the parol
evidence question.

Both parties (as well as Defendant's counsel)

testified that there were additional oral agreements and
understandings not included in the Employment Agreement; the
evidence presented with respect to the surrounding circumstances
renders absurd Defendant's contention that the Employment
Agreement was intended to be the "full and complete" agreement
between the parties; and the Court made very clear at the close
of Plaintiff's case and again during closing argument that it did
not believe that the parties ever intended that Plaintiff would
go to work for Defendant.
Furthermore, even if it might otherwise have been proper for
the District Court to find or conclude that the Employment
Agreement was subject to the parol evidence rule, the rule does
not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence for the
purpose of proving "whether or not there is consideration for a
promise, even though the parties have reduced their agreement to
a writing which appears to be a completely integrated agreement."
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah App.
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1988)(quoting from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218(2)
(1981); and also citing Soukop v. Snyder. 709 P.2d 109, 113
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1985)).
That is precisely the situation in the case at bar.
Defendant contends that it was entitled to stop payments to Mrs.
Hall under the Employment Agreement because she did not come to
work, i.e., there was a failure of consideration.

Conversely,

Mrs. Hall contends that the parties never intended that she would
ever go to work for Defendant; rather, that the consideration for
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was her
promise to forego any claim to alimony in the Divorce Action
simultaneously taking place between herself and Defendant's
President and sole shareholder.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218 in comment (e)
explains that "An incorrect statement of a consideration
[contained in an apparently integrated agreement] does not
prevent proof either that there was no consideration or that
there was a consideration different from that stated."

Thus,

even if the Employment Agreement could properly be characterized
as "integrated", Mrs. Hall was entitled to introduce extrinsic
evidence to prove that the consideration given by her under the
agreement was her promise to forego any claim to alimony in the
Divorce Action.
Finally, even though the terms of the Employment Agreement
may be unambiguous, the above discussed circumstances under which
the agreement was entered into clearly show that the character of
the Employment Agreement itself is ambiguous and, therefore, not
subject to the parol evidence rule. E.g. Colonial Leasing Co. v.
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Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d at 487 (parol evidence is
admissible "where the character of the written agreement itself
is ambiguous even though its specific terms are not ambiguous").
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the
District Court's conclusions/findings with respect to the parol
evidence issue are neither supported by substantial evidence nor
in accordance with the law and must be rejected.
(3) The District Court abused its discretion in disallowing
the testimony of Brent Turley.
As noted above, Plaintiff attempted to introduce and
preferred the testimony of Mr. Brent Turley that::
Mr. Hall offered to purchase ... Mr. Turleyfs
home, using as the down payment an employment contract
just like the one we [have] here in which Mr. Turley
would be an employee of the company, receive salary and
benefits in exchange for the down paym€*nt on his home.
(Trial Tr. at p. 60, lines 16-22).

The District Court sustained Defendant's objection to Mr.
Turley's testimony on the grounds of relevance.

(Trial Tr. at p.

60, lines 14-15)
Plaintiff submits that Mr. Turleyfs testimony would clearly
have been relevant and that the District Court abused its
discretion in ruling to the contrary.
The Pre-Trial Order identifies the "Factual Disputes
Remaining For Trial" as:
1. Whether the consideration given by Plaintiff for
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was her
promise to forego any claim to alimony in connection with
the divorce proceeding simultaneously taking place between
Plaintiff and Defendant's President and sole shareholder,
John A. Hall.
2. Whether the parties ever intended that Plaintiff
would actually go to work for Defendant under the Employment
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Agreement.
3. Whether the written Employment Agreement was
intended by the parties to represent the full and complete
agreement of the parties.
(R. 00150 and Addendum 1 attached hereto)
Clearly, Mr. Turley's testimony would have been relevant to
each of these questions.

Mrs. Hall's position is that Mr. Hall

attempted to buy out of his alimony obligation by giving her an
Employment Contract with his company.

Mr. Turley would have

testified that Mr. Hall attempted to do essentially the same
thing with respect to the down-payment on the home he purchased
from Mr. Turley.

Thus, in a case like the one at bar, which is

essentially a swearing contest between the parties, Mr. Turley's
testimony would not only have been highly relevant it would have
been extremely important corroboration.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests
that the District Court's Judgment be reversed and that this
action be remanded to the District Court with instructions for
further proceedings qor^astent with this Court's decision.
DATED this />-J day of September,

/^Mitchell
Appellant
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Addendum 1

SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111)
Kearns Building, Suite 721
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

MARGARET B. HALL,
*

Plaintiff,

*

PRE-TRIAL ORDER

*

vs.

*

PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTROL, INC., a Utah
corporation,

*
*
*

*

Civil no. C82-4399

*

Defendant.

*
*

*

Honorable John A. Rokich
*

*

By agreement of the parties, the Court hereby issues the
following Pre-Trial Order.
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. At all relevant times prior to June 9, 1981, Plaintiff and
Defendant's President and sole shareholder, John A. Hall, were
husband and wife.
2. On June 9, 1981, a Decree of Divorce was entered in Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. D-81-695,
dissolving the bonds of matrimony theretofore existing between
Plaintiff and John A. Hall.

The Decree became effective as of

September 9, 1981.
3.

On or about February 20, 1981, Plaintiff and Defendant

entered into an agreement entitled "Employment Agreement".

00143

4.

Plaintiff never went to work for Defendant under the

Employment Agreement.
5. Defendant paid Plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 pursuant to
the Employment Agreement between March of 1981 and May of 1982.
9. Defendant hcis failed to make any payments called for under
the Employment Agreement from and after May 14, 1982.
10.

Plaintiff remarried on or about May 31, 1982.

11.

The parties have stipulated that if the Court determines

that the Employment Agreement is enforceable, Plaintiff is entitled
to recover the sum of $21,500.00, plus interest at the rate of
eight percent per annum from the respective dates of Defendantf s
breach of the Employment Agreement until the date of judgment and
thereafter at the rate of twelve percent per annum until paid, for
Defendant's failure to pay to Plaintiff the $1,000.00 per month
salary called for under the agreement after May 14, 1982.
12.

The parties have stipulated that if the Court determines

that the Employment Agreement is enforceable, Plaintiff is entitled
to recover the sum of $1,506.10, plus interest at the rate of eight
percent per annum from March 31, 1984, until the date of judgment
and thereafter at the rate of twelve percent per annum until paid,
for Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff's share of the Defendant's
Profit Sharing Plan.
13.

Plaintiff and John Hall executed

an Ante-Nuputial

Agreement on or about February 2, 1976, pursuant to which they
agreed on the terms of any alimony award in the event of divorce.

2
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II. FACTUAL DISPUTES REMAINING FOR TRIAL
1.

Whether

Defendant's

the

consideration

promises under

given

by

Plaintiff

the Employment Agreement

was

for
her

agreement to forego any claim to alimony in connection with the
divorce proceeding simultaneously taking place between Plaintiff
and Defendant's President and sole shareholder, John A. Hall.
2.

Whether the parties ever intended that Plaintiff would

actually go to work for Defendant under the Employment Agreement.
3.

Whether the written Employment Agreement was intended by

the parties to represent the full and complete agreement of the
parties.
III. QUESTIONS OF LAW REMAINING FOR DETERMINATION
1.

Whether Defendant's obligations under the Employment

Agreement terminated automatically upon Plaintiff's remarriage by
virtue of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(5).
2. Whether the "Parol Evidence Rule" precludes Plaintiff from
introducing evidence of contemporaneous conversations, statements,
or representations of the parties for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of the Employment Agreement.
3.

Whether Plaintiff breached the Employment Agreement by

failing to go to work for Defendant.
4.

Whether an enforceable contract exists between the

parties•
IV. WITNESSES TO BE CALLED TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL
(A) Witnesses to be called by Plaintiff
Plaintiff intends to call the following witnesses to testify
3
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at the trial of this matter:
1.

Plaintiff

2.

John A. Hall

3.

Brent Turley

4.

Any witness called to testify by Defendant

(B) Witnesses to be called by Defendant
1.

John A. Hall

2.

Plaintiff

3.

Pete Ennega

V. EXHIBITS TO BE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL
(A) Exhibits to be introduced by Plaintiff
1.

Employment Agreement dated February 20, 1981•

2.

All pleadings, exhibits and other papers on file in this

matter.
3. Defendant's responses to Interrogatories and all documents
produced by Defendant in response to Plaintiff's requests for
production of documents.
4. The depositions of John A. Hall, Margaret Martin, and Pete
Ennega, and all deposition exhibits.
5.

Copies of PIC check numbers 1201 and 1188; and PIC check

stubs for check numbers 1129, 1160, 1091, 1106, 1066, 1081, 1019,
1054, 1008; and PIC check stubs dated 09-30-1981, 08-31-1981, 0915-1981, 06-15-1981, 06-30-1981, 07-31-1981, 05-28-1981, 04-301981, 5-15-1981, 04-15-1981, 03-31-1981, 03-13-1981, 02-27-1981.
6.

Hand-written memo from J to Maggie.

7.

Decree Of Divorce entered in civil no. D-81-695

C0151
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8.

Complaint and Anwser filed in civil no. D-80-2725

9.

Assignment dated February 20, 1981, relating to 450 SL

Mercedes
(B) Exhibits to be introduced by Defendant
Defendant intends to introduce the following exhibits at
trial:
1.

Ante-Nuptial Agreement dated February 26, 1976

DATED this

f3

day of November, 1991.

^

^

rable John A. Rokich
"strict Court Judge
Appro)
/
(

Scotr ^B ."'Mitchelj
Attorney for Plaintiff

ames A. Mclntyi
Attorney for Defendant
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Addendum 2

JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
Attorney for Defendant
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-3399

MAR 4
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET B. HALL,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil No. C82-4399

PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTROL, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.
BASED upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file
herein and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff have
judgment against the Defendant of no cause of action.

Each party

shall bear their own costs and fees herein.
DATED this

^

day of
BY THE COURT:

RABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge
APPROEVED AS TO FORM:

SCOTT B. MITCHELL
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Addendum 3

•] . ^ j ? . , ' >Z

JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
Attorney for Defendant
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-3399

MAR

h 1992

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET B. HALL,
FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C82-4399
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTROL, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.
This cause came on regularly for hearing on the 14th day of
November, 1991, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock a.m. before the
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge of the above-entitled
Court. The Plaintiff appeared personally with her attorney, Scott
B. Mitchell. The Defendant appeared personally with its attorney,
James A. Mclntyre. The Court heard the testimony of witnesses,
admitted documentary evidence, read the memoranda submitted and
took the matter under advisement, the Court having been fully
advised in the premises finds as follows:
Findings of Fact
1.

Plaintiff was formerly married to John A. Hall, the sole

shareholder of Defendant.
2.

Plaintiff and John A. Hall were divorced on June 8, 1981.

3.

The decree of divorce provided that no alimony be awarded to
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Plaintiff.
4.

The

decree

of

divorce

provided

with

specificity

the

distribution of the marital estate and did not refer to the
settlement agreement between those parties; however, the decree
makes no reference to the employment agreement as being a part of
the settlement agreement.
5.

On February 20, 1981 plaintiff and defendant entered into an

employment agreement the terms of which were clear and unambiguous
#

and appear to be complete and certain.
6.

The parties testified that the underlying purpose of the

employment agreement was to provide income and nodical insurance
coverage inasmuch as Plaintiff was suffering from hepatitis at the
time the agreement was executed.
7.

Defendant paid plaintiff for a period of 14 months even though

plaintiff never performed any work.
8.

Defendant thereafter terminated plaintiff and sent her a

termination notice ( on May 20, 1982 ).
9.

Plaintiff remarried and moved from the State of Utah shortly

following the termination of the agreement ( on May 31, 1982 ).
10.

Plaintiff filed suit herein to enforce the terms of the

employment agreement.
11.
fully

Plaintiff alleged in her initial complaint that "Plaintiff has
performed

the

obligations

and

rendered

the

services

contemplated by said agreement and plaintiff continues to be able
and willing to perform such obligations.
12.

The evidence did not support plaintiff's claim that she had
2
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fully

performed

the

obligations

and

rendered

the

services

contemplated by the employment agreement.
13.

Eight years after the filing of' her original

complaint

plaintiff amended her Complaint to allege that the employment
agreement had been entered into in return for plaintiff's promise
to forego alimony because she realized that she was unable to prove
that she had performed or was willing to perform her obligations
under the employment agreement as written.
14.

At trial defendant interposed an objection to all evidence of

the agreement of the parties other than the writing itself based
upon the parole evidence rule.
15.

Plaintiff was allowed to introduce parole evidence, subject

to exclusion, in order to attempt to establish that the agreement
was not either an integration or a partially integrated contract.
16.

Plaintiff's claim for relief under any of her theories was the

total of benefits conferred by the terms of the written agreement.
Conclusions of Law
1.

The Plaintiff's claim fails under the employment agreement

because she failed to perform the obligations of that agreement.
2.

The Plaintiff's

claim that the employment agreement was

entered into in lieu of alimony fails because, absent written
agreement to the contrary, alimony terminates upon remarriage.
3.

The employment agreement was not included in the decree of

divorce, therefore it is unenforceable as a part of the decree of
divorce.
4.

Plaintiff fail to establish that the meaning or intent of the
3
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employment agreement was anything other than its clearly written
terms which would give rise to an enforceable agreement under any
one of the legal theories advanced during the course of this
litigation•
5.

The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face

and not subject to change by parole evidence.
6.

Since Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof on any of

her legal theories she is entitled to a judgement of no cause of
action.
DATED this

*?

day of

A12 * oC^-

19^2^

BY THE COURT:

/? c
HQNj&RABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
D f s t r i c t Court Judge
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